The proportion of "rms paying cash dividends falls from 66.5% in 1978 to 20.8% in 1999, due in part to the changing characteristics of publicly traded "rms. Fed by new listings, the population of publicly traded "rms tilts increasingly toward small "rms with low pro"tability and strong growth opportunities } characteristics typical of "rms that have never paid dividends. More interesting, we also show that regardless of their characteristics, "rms have become less likely to pay dividends. This lower propensity to pay is at least as important as changing characteristics in the declining incidence of dividend-paying "rms.
Introduction
Dividends have long been an enigma. Since they are taxed at a higher rate than capital gains, the common presumption is that dividends are less valuable than capital gains. In this view, "rms that pay dividends are at a competitive disadvantage since they have a higher cost of equity than "rms that do not pay. The fact that many "rms pay dividends is then di$cult to explain.
Using CRSP and Compustat, we study the incidence of dividend payers during the 1926}99 period, with special interest in the period after 1972, when the data cover NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ "rms. The percent of "rms paying dividends declines sharply after 1978. In 1973, 52.8% of publicly traded non-"nancial non-utility "rms pay dividends. The proportion of payers rises to a peak of 66.5% in 1978. It then falls rather relentlessly. In 1999, only 20.8% of "rms pay dividends.
The decline after 1978 in the percent of "rms paying dividends raises three questions. (i) What are the characteristics of dividend payers? (ii) Is the decline in the percent of payers due to a decline in the prevalence of these characteristics among publicly traded "rms, or (iii) have "rms with the characteristics typical of dividend payers become less likely to pay? We address these questions.
We use logit regressions and summary statistics to examine the characteristics of dividend payers. Both approaches suggest that three characteristics a!ect the decision to pay dividends: pro"tability, investment opportunities, and size. Larger "rms and more pro"table "rms are more likely to pay dividends. Dividends are less likely for "rms with more investments.
The summary statistics provide details on the nature of dividend payers, former payers, and "rms that have never paid. Former payers tend to be distressed. They have low earnings and few investments. Firms that have never paid dividends are more pro"table than former payers and they have strong growth opportunities. Dividend payers are, in turn, more pro"table than "rms that have never paid. But "rms that have never paid invest at a higher rate, do more R&D, and have a higher ratio of the market value of assets to their book value (< R /A R , a proxy for Tobin's Q) than dividend payers. The investments of dividend payers are on the order of pre-interest earnings, but the investments of "rms that have never paid exceed earnings. Finally, payers are about 10 times as large as non-payers.
The decline after 1978 in the percent of "rms paying dividends is due in part to an increasing tilt of publicly traded "rms toward the characteristics of "rms that have never paid } low earnings, strong investments, and small size. This tilt in the population of "rms is driven by an explosion of newly listed "rms, and by the changing nature of the new "rms. The number of publicly traded non-"nancial non-utility "rms grows from 3,638 in 1978 to 5,670 in 1997, before declining to 5,113 in 1999. Newly listed "rms always tend to be small, with extraordinary investment opportunities (high asset growth rates and high < R /A R ). What changes after 1978 is their pro"tability. Before 1978, new lists are more pro"table than seasoned "rms. In 1973}77, the earnings of new lists average a hefty 17.79% of book equity, versus 13.68% for all "rms. The pro"tability of new lists falls throughout the next 20 years. The earnings of new lists in 1993}98 average 2.07% of book equity, versus 11.26% for all "rms. The decline in the pro"tability of new lists is accompanied by a decline in the percent of new lists that pay dividends. During 1973}77, one-third of newly listed "rms pay dividends. In 1999, only 3.7% of new lists pay dividends. The surge in numbers and the changing nature of new lists produce a swelling group of small "rms with low pro"tability but large investments that have never paid dividends. This group of "rms is a big factor in the decline in the percent of "rms paying dividends.
It is perhaps obvious that investors have become more willing to hold the shares of small, relatively unpro"table growth companies. But the resulting tilt of the publicly traded population toward such "rms is only half of the story for the declining incidence of dividend payers. Our more striking "nding is that "rms have become less likely to pay dividends, whatever their characteristics. We characterize the decline in the likelihood that a "rm pays dividends, given its characteristics, as a lower propensity to pay. What we mean is that the perceived bene"ts of dividends (whatever they are) have declined through time.
We use two approaches to quantify how characteristics and propensity to pay combine to produce the decline in the percent of dividend payers. One approach works with logit regressions. The other uses relative frequencies of payers in portfolios formed on pro"tability, investment opportunities, and size. Both approaches say that lower propensity to pay is at least as important as changing characteristics in explaining the decline in the percent of dividend payers.
Lower propensity to pay is quite general. For example, the percent of dividend payers among "rms with positive earnings declines after 1978. But the percent of payers among "rms with negative earnings also declines. Small "rms become much less likely to pay dividends after 1978, but there is also a lower incidence of dividend payers among large "rms. Firms with many investment opportunities become much less likely to pay dividends after 1978, but dividends also become less likely among "rms with fewer investments.
The e!ects of changing characteristics and propensity to pay vary across dividend groups. The characteristics of dividend payers (large, pro"table "rms) do not change much after 1978, and controlling for characteristics, payers become only a bit more likely to stop paying. Changing characteristics and lower propensity to pay show up more clearly in the dividend decisions of former payers and "rms that have never paid. For example, after 1978, lower pro"tability and abundant growth opportunities produce much lower expected rates of dividend initiation by "rms that have never paid. But controlling for characteristics, "rms that have never paid also initiate dividends at much lower rates after 1978, and former payers become much less likely to resume dividends.
Share repurchases jump in the 1980s, and it is interesting to examine the role of repurchases in the declining incidence of dividend payers. We show that because repurchases are largely the province of dividend payers, they leave the decline in the percent of payers largely unexplained. Instead, the primary e!ect of repurchases is to increase the already high earnings payouts of cash dividend payers.
Our story proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the facts about dividends to be explained. Section 3 documents the characteristics of dividend payers and the progressive tilt of the population of publicly traded "rms toward the characteristics of "rms that have never paid. Section 4 presents qualitative evidence on the reduced propensity to pay dividends. Section 5 quanti"es the e!ects of characteristics and propensity to pay. Section 6 examines share repurchases. Section 7 concludes.
Time trends in cash dividends
Our goal is to explain the decline after 1978 in the incidence of dividend payers among NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ "rms. We begin by examining the behavior of dividends for the longer 1926}99 period covered by CRSP. Fig. 1 shows the total number of non-"nancial non-utility "rms on CRSP each year, and the number of "rms that (i) pay cash dividends, (ii) do not pay, (iii) formerly paid, and (iv) have never paid. Fig. 2 shows percents of the total number of "rms in the four dividend groups. We exclude utilities from the tests to avoid the criticism that their dividend decisions are a byproduct of regulation. We also exclude "nancial "rms. The data to come on the characteristics of dividend payers are from Compustat, and Compustat's historical coverage of "nancial "rms is spotty. Until mid-1962, CRSP covers only NYSE "rms. The jumps in the total number of "rms in 1963 and 1973 in Fig. 1 are due to the addition of AMEX and then NASDAQ "rms.
The proportion of NYSE non-"nancial non-utility "rms paying dividends falls by half during the early years of the Great Depression, from 66.9% in 1930 to 33.6% in 1933 (Fig. 2) . Thereafter, the percent paying rises. In every year from 1943 to 1962, more than 82% of NYSE "rms pay dividends. More than 90% pay dividends in 1951 and 1952 . With the addition of AMEX "rms in 1963, the proportion of payers drops to 69.3%. The addition of NASDAQ "rms in 1973 lowers the proportion of payers to 52.8%, from 59.8% in 1972. It then rises to 66.5% in 1978, the peak for the post-1972 period of NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ coverage. The proportion paying declines sharply after 1978, to 30.3% for 1987. It continues to decline thereafter, though less rapidly. In 1999, only 20.8% of "rms pay dividends.
Both the numerator (the number of dividend payers) and the denominator (the number of sample "rms) contribute to the decline after 1978 in the percent Fig. 1 . The number of CRSP "rms in di!erent dividend groups. The CRSP sample includes NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ securities with share codes of 10 or 11. A "rm must have market equity data (price and shares outstanding) for December of year t to be in the sample for that year. We exclude utilities (SIC codes 4900}4949) and "nancial "rms (SIC codes 6000}6999). Payers pay dividends in year t; non-payers do not. The two subgroups of non-payers are "rms that have never paid and former payers ("rms that do not pay in year t but did pay in a previous year).
of "rms paying dividends. Swelling numbers of new listings cause the CRSP sample to expand by about 40%, from 3,638 "rms in 1978 to 5,113 in 1999 (Fig. 1) . New lists average 5.2% of listed "rms (114 per year) during 1963}77, versus 9.6% (436 per year) for 1978}99 (Table 1) .
More interesting, the population of dividend payers shrinks by more than 50% after 1978. There are 2,419 dividend payers in 1978 but only 1,182 in 1991 and 1,063 in 1999 (Fig. 1) . The decline in the number of payers means that payers added to the sample fail to replace those lost. Dividend payers are lost when "rms stop paying dividends or disappear from CRSP due to merger or delisting. Payers are added to the sample when former payers resume dividends, "rms that have never paid initiate dividends, or new "rms pay dividends in the year of listing. Table 2 provides details on the change in the number of payers. The rate at which dividend payers are lost from the sample (due to dividend terminations, mergers, and delistings) rises from 6.8% per year for 1963}77 to 9.8% for 1978}99. Much of the increase is due to mergers. There is no clear trend in the rate at which dividend payers terminate dividends. During 1978}99, on average 5.0% of payers stop paying each year. This is higher than the termination rate Fig. 2 . The percent of CRSP "rms in di!erent dividend groups. The CRSP sample includes NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ securities with share codes of 10 or 11. A "rm must have market equity data (price and shares outstanding) for December of year t to be in the sample for that year. We exclude utilities (SIC codes 4900}4949) and "nancial "rms (SIC codes 6000}6999). Payers pay dividends in year t; non-payers do not. The two subgroups of non-payers are "rms that have never paid and former payers ("rms that do not pay in year t but did pay in a previous year).
for 1963}77, 3.5% per year, but it is lower than the rate for 1927}62, 5.4% per year. A relatively steady termination rate is consistent with the evidence in DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) and DeAngelo et al. (1992) that only distressed "rms (with strongly negative earnings) terminate dividends. In contrast, during 1978}99, dividend payers merge into other "rms at the rate of 3.9% per year. This is higher than the merger rates for 1927}62 (0.6% per year) and 1963}77 (2.7% per year). Dividend payers delist at the rate of 0.9% per year during 1978}99, versus 0.3% for 1927}62 and 0.8% for 1963}77.
Dividend payers disappear at a higher rate during 1978}98, but the more important factor in the decline in the number of payers is the failure of new payers to replace those that are lost. Former payers (always a relatively small group) resume dividends at an average rate of 11.8% per year during 1963}77; this rate falls to 6.2% per year for 1978}99 and 2.5% for 1999. New lists surge after 1978, but the proportion paying dividends in the year of listing declines from 50.8% for 1963}77 to 9.0% for 1978}99 and only 3.7% in 1999 (Table 1) . New lists feed a swelling group of "rms that never get around to paying dividends. The initiation rate for "rms that have never paid dividends drops from 7.1% per year for 1963}77 to 1.8% for 1978}99 and a tiny 0.7% for 1999. Table 1 Counts and percents of CRSP and Compustat "rms in di!erent dividend groups Payers pay dividends in year t; non-payers do not. The two subgroups of non-payers are "rms that have never paid and former payers ("rms that do not pay in year t but did pay in a previous year). A new list is a "rm that "rst appears on CRSP or Compustat in year t.
(See the appendix for more complete de"nitions of payers, non-payers, and new lists.) New Lists that Pay is the percent of newly listed "rms that pay in year t.
The numbers are averages of annual values for the indicated time periods. Counts of CRSP "rms 1926}62 1963}99 1963}77 1978}99 1963}67 1968}72 1973}77 1978}82 1983}87 1988}92 1993}98 1999 All "rms Counts of Compustat "rms 1963}98 1963}77 1978}98 1963}67 1968}72 1973}77 1978}82 1983}87 1988}92 1993}98 All "rms 1926}62 1963}99 1963}77 1978}99 1963}67 1968}72 1973}77 1978}82 1983}87 1988}92 1993}98 1999 1963}98 1963}77 1978}98 1963}67 1968}72 1973}77 1978}82 1983}87 1988}92 1993}98 What happens in year t to "rms that pay dividends in year t!1 1963}99 1963}77 1978}99 1963}67 1968}72 1973}77 1978}82 1983}87 1988}92 1993}98 1999 Continue to pay What happens in year t to "rms that do not pay dividends in year t!1 1963}99 1963}77 1978}99 1963}67 1968}72 1973}77 1978}82 1983}87 1988}92 1993}98 1999 1927}62 1963}99 1963}77 1978}99 1963}67 1968}72 1973}77 1978}82 1983}87 1988}92 1993}98 1999 All non-payers in t!1 Although mergers contribute to the decline in the number of dividend payers, they are not important in the decline in the percent of payers. During the critical 1978}99 period, non-payers merge into other "rms at about the same rate (3.8% per year) as payers (3.9% per year), so mergers have little e!ect on the percent of "rms paying dividends. Non-payers delist at a higher rate (6.3% per year for 1978}99) than payers (0.9% per year). Thus, delistings reduce the number of "rms paying dividends, but they actually increase the percent of "rms paying. Fig. 2 gives a simple view of the factors that contribute to the decline in the percent of "rms paying dividends. Terminations by dividend payers and resumptions by former payers have little net e!ect. Terminations and resumptions determine the population of former payers, which grows from 319 "rms in 1978 to 466 in 1999 (Fig. 1) . Because the number of listed "rms also grows, the proportion of all "rms accounted for by former payers only rises from 8.8% in 1978 to 9.1% in 1999 (Fig. 2) . As a result, the decline in the proportion of "rms paying dividends (from 66.5% in 1978 to 20.8% in 1999) almost matches the growth in the proportion that have never paid (from 24.7% in 1978 to 70.1% in 1999) . This group (new lists that never become dividend payers) is a big factor in both the decline in the numerator of the percent of dividend payers (the number of payers) and the increase in the denominator (the number of sample "rms).
The rest of the paper addresses two questions raised by the declining incidence of dividend payers: (i) Has the population of "rms drifted toward a lower frequency of "rms with the characteristics typical of payers, or (ii) have "rms with the characteristics typical of payers become less likely to pay dividends? We start by establishing the characteristics of dividend payers, and the declining incidence of these characteristics among publicly traded "rms.
Characteristics of dividend payers
Our evidence on the characteristics of dividend payers and non-payers is from Compustat. The time period, 1963}98, is shorter than the 1926}99 CRSP period examined above, but the Compustat data cover the post-1972 NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ period and the post-1978 period of most interest to us.
On average, the CRSP sample has about 750 more "rms than the Compustat sample in their shared 1963}98 period ( Table 1 ). The di!erence between the samples is due to CRSP's more complete coverage and the data requirements we impose on the Compustat sample (see the appendix). But the Compustat sample does show the sharp decline in the percent of dividend payers observed in the CRSP sample. Dividend payers average 64.3% of Compustat "rms in 1973}77 and 23.6% in 1993}98 ( Table 1 ). The averages for CRSP are 60. 3% in 1973}77 and 23.5% in 1993}98. Our initial discussion of the characteristics of dividend payers focuses on the evidence from summary statistics that payers and non-payers di!er in terms of pro"tability, investment opportunities, and size. The evidence from the summary statistics is then con"rmed with logit regressions. Table 3 details the characteristics of "rms in various dividend groups. Dividend payers have higher measured pro"tability than non-payers. For the full 1963}98 period, E R /A R (the ratio of aggregate earnings before interest to aggregate assets) averages 7.82% per year for payers versus 5.37% for non-payers. Among non-payers, E R /A R averages 4.54% per year for former dividend payers. This is lower than the pro"tability of "rms that have never paid dividends, 6.11% per year, which in turn is below the pro"tability of dividend payers, 7.82% per year.
Proxtability
Earnings before interest, E R , are the payo! on a "rm's assets, but earnings available for common, > R , may be more relevant for the decision to pay dividends. Table 3 shows that the gap between the pro"tability of payers and non-payers is wider when pro"tability is measured as > R /BE R (aggregate common stock earnings over aggregate book equity). For 1963}98, > R /BE R averages 12.75% for dividend payers, versus 6.15% for non-payers. Among non-payers, > R /BE R averages 7.94% for "rms that have never paid dividends and only 3.18% for former payers.
Low pro"tability becomes more common in the second half of the 1963}98 period. The plots of the decile breakpoints for E R /A R in Fig. 3 provide perspective. Initially the breakpoints drift upward, peaking around 1979 or 1980. After the peak years, pro"tability declines. The decline is marginal in the higher pro"tability deciles, but it is large in the lower pro"tability deciles. The lowest breakpoint (the tenth percentile) switches from consistently positive to consistently negative in 1982. At least 20% of "rms have negative earnings before interest after 1984. In the last three years, 1996}98, negative earnings before interest a%ict more than 30% of the "rms.
Many of the "rms that are unpro"table later in the sample period are new listings. Until 1978, more than 90% of new lists are pro"table (Fig. 4) . Thereafter, the fraction with positive earnings falls. In 1998, only 51.5% of new lists have positive common stock earnings. Table 3 shows that before 1982, new lists } even new lists that do not pay dividends } tend to be more pro"table than all publicly traded "rms. After 1982 the pro"tability of new lists falls. The deterioration occurs as the number of new lists explodes, and it is dramatic for the increasingly large group of new lists that do not pay dividends. By 1993}98 (when there are 511 Compustat new lists per year and only 5.2% pay dividends), the common stock earnings of newly listed non-payers average only 0.27% of book equity, versus 11.26% for all "rms. The low pro"tability of new lists later in the sample period is in line with similar evidence on the low post-issue pro"tability of IPO "rms (Jain and Kini, 1994; Mikkelson et al., 1997) . Table 3 Average "rm size, and ratios of aggregate earnings, investment, "rm value, and liabilities to aggregate assets and book equity, for di!erent dividend groups and for new lists A R , BE R , ME R ,¸R"A R !BE R , and < R "¸R#ME R are assets, book common equity, market value of common equity, book liabilities, and total market value, at the end of "scal year t. E R , > R , D R , and RD R are earnings before interest but after taxes, after-tax earnings to common stock, dividends, and R&D expenditures for "scal year t. Investment, dA R , is A R !A R\ . The ratios shown are ratios of the year t aggregate values of the variables for the "rms in a group, averaged over the years in a period. Results are shown for all "rms and for "rms grouped according to dividend status. Results are also shown for all new lists and for newly listed dividend payers and non-payers. 1963}98 1963}67 1968}72 1973}77 1978}82 1983}87 1988}92 1993}98 After 1977, more than 85% of new lists trade on NASDAQ. One might suspect that the declining incidence of dividend payers is a NASDAQ phenomenon, driven by looser listing standards. In fact, all three exchanges contribute to the growth of unpro"table new lists. Among "rms that begin trading between 1978 and 1998, 10.7% of NYSE new lists, 29.0% of AMEX new lists, and 23.6% of NASDAQ new lists have negative common stock earnings. Fig. 5 shows that all three exchanges experience large declines in the percent of payers after 1978. The fraction of NYSE "rms paying dividends drops from 88.6% in 1979 to 52.0% in 1999, a level not seen since the Great Depression. AMEX and NASDAQ payers drop from peaks of 63. 4 and 54.1% in 1978 and 1977 to 16.9 and 8.6% in 1999 . Thus, although it coincides with the explosion of unpro"table NASDAQ new lists, the decline in the percent of "rms paying dividends is not limited to NASDAQ.
Fig. 3. Decile breakpoints for E
R /A R . The sample of Compustat "rms for calendar year t, 1963}98, includes non-"nancial non-utility "rms with "scal year-ends in t that satisfy the data requirements described in the appendix. E R is earnings before interest but after taxes in year t. A R is the book value of assets in year t.
Investment opportunities
Like pro"tability, investment opportunities di!er across dividend groups. Firms that have never paid dividends have the best growth opportunities. Table 3 shows that they have much higher asset growth rates for 1963}98 (16.50% per year) than dividend payers (8.78%) or former payers (4.67%). < R /A R (the ratio of the aggregate market value to the aggregate book value of assets) is also higher for "rms that have never paid (1.64) than for payers (1.39) or former payers (1.10). The R&D expenditures of "rms that have never paid are on average 2.76% of their assets, versus 1.61% for dividend payers and 1.03% for former payers. Thus, though "rms that have never paid seem to be less pro"table than dividend payers, they have better growth opportunities. In contrast, former payers are victims of a double whammy } low pro"tability and poor investment opportunities.
Newly listed "rms are again of interest. Dividend-paying new lists invest at a higher rate during 1963}98 (13.42% per year, Table 3 ) than all dividend payers (8.78%). There is an even larger spread between the asset growth rates of non-paying new lists and all non-paying "rms. The 1963}98 average growth rate for non-paying new lists } an extraordinary 30.28% per year } is almost twice the high 16.50% average growth rate for all "rms that have never paid dividends. Similarly, < R /A R is higher for newly listed non-payers than for all "rms that have never paid dividends. Thus, although newly listed non-payers su!er from low pro"tability later in the period, they have abundant investments.
Some readers express a preference for capital expenditures (roughly the change in long-term assets), rather than the change in total assets, to measure investment. Our view is that short-term assets are investments. Just as they invest in machines, "rms invest in cash, accounts receivable, and inventory to facilitate their business activities. And when cash is retained for future long-term investments, the resources for these investments are committed when the cash is acquired.
Finally, a caveat is in order. The investment evidence suggests that, measured by E R /A R , the pro"tability advantage of dividend payers over "rms that have never paid is probably exaggerated, for three reasons. (i) If investments take time to reach full pro"tability, E R /A R understates pro"tability for growing "rms. And "rms that have never paid grow faster than dividend payers. (ii) When R&D is Fig. 5 . Percent of CRSP "rms paying dividends. The CRSP sample includes NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ securities with share codes of 10 or 11. A "rm must have market equity data (price and shares outstanding) for December of year t to be in the sample for that year. We exclude utilities (SIC codes 4900}4949) and "nancial "rms (SIC codes 6000}6999).
a multiperiod asset, mandatory expensing of R&D causes us to understate earnings and assets. If R&D is growing, E R /A R understates pro"tability. RD R /A R is higher for "rms that have never paid dividends than for dividend payers. And the RD R /A R spread grows through time, from 0.32% in 1973}77 to 1.98% in 1993}98 (Table 3 ). (iii) Since "rms that have never paid dividends grow faster, their assets are on average younger than those of dividend payers. In#ation is then likely to cause us to overstate the pro"tability advantage of dividend payers relative to "rms that have never paid.
Size
Dividend payers are much larger than non-payers. During 1963}67, the assets of payers average about eight times those of non-payers (Table 3 ). In the non-payer group, former payers are about three times the size of "rms that have never paid. In later years, as the Compustat sample grows and the number of payers declines, payers become even larger relative to non-payers. During 1993}98, the assets of payers average more than 13 times those of non-payers. Table 4 gives a di!erent perspective on the relative size of dividend payers and non-payers. The table shows that payers account for 93.5}95.8% of the aggregate book and market values of assets and common stock during 1973}77, when Table 4 Percent of aggregate values accounted for by "rms paying dividends A R , BE R , ME R ,¸R"A R !BE R , and < R "¸R#ME R are assets, book common equity, market value of common equity, book liabilities, and total market value, at the end of "scal year t. dA R "A R !A R\ is the change in assets in "scal year t. E R , > R , SP R , and SI R are earnings before interest but after taxes, after-tax earnings to common stock, stock purchases, and stock issues for "scal year t. d¹ R is the change in treasury stock. The table shows average values for the indicated periods of the year t percents of the aggregate values of the variables (sums over all Compustat "rms in the sample) accounted for by "rms that pay dividends. 1963}98 1971}98 1983}98 1963}67 1968}72 1973}77 1978}82 1983}87 1988}92 1993}98 64.3% of "rms in the Compustat sample pay dividends. Even during 1993}98, when fewer than one-quarter of Compustat "rms pay dividends, payers account for more than three-quarters of aggregate book and market values. Dividend payers are more pro"table and non-payers derive more of their market value from expected growth, so the share of dividend payers in aggregate earnings is even higher than their share of assets and market values. During each of the four "ve-year periods from 1973 to 1992, payers account for about 97% of common stock earnings (Table 4) . For 1993}98, the 23.6% of "rms that pay dividends account for all but 8.3% of aggregate earnings.
The fact that, even at the end of the sample period, dividend payers account for a large fraction of aggregate earnings, is, however, a bit misleading. Firms with negative earnings (mostly non-payers) become more common later in the sample period. As a result, we shall see that dividend payers can continue to account for a large fraction of aggregate earnings even though an increasing fraction of pro"table "rms, that in earlier times would be dividend payers, are now non-payers.
Finally, "rms that do not pay dividends are big issuers of equity. During 1971}98 (when data on stock purchases and issues are available on Compustat), the aggregate net stock issues of non-payers average 2.80% of the aggregate market value of their common stock, versus a trivial !0.05% for dividend payers. Dividend payers' share of gross stock issues drops from 90.4% for 1973}77 to 35.8% for 1993}98 (Table 4) . Thus, though much less important on other dimensions, "rms that do not pay dividends currently account for almost two-thirds of the aggregate value of stock issues. This is not surprising, given that the non-payer group tilts increasingly toward growth "rms with investment outlays much in excess of their earnings.
Synopsis
The evidence suggests that three fundamentals } pro"tability, investment opportunities, and size } are factors in the decision to pay dividends. Dividend payers tend to be large, pro"table "rms with earnings on the order of investment outlays ( Table 3 ). Firms that have never paid are smaller and they seem to be less pro"table than dividend payers, but they have more investment opportunities (higher asset growth rates, higher < R /A R , and higher RD R /A R ), and their investment outlays are much larger than their earnings. The salient characteristics of former dividend payers are low earnings and few investments.
The steady decline after 1978 in the percent of "rms paying dividends is in part due to an increasing tilt of the population of publicly traded "rms toward the characteristics typical of "rms that have never paid. The source of the tilt is new lists. There is a surge in newly listed "rms after 1977, and they di!er from earlier new lists. During the early years of the 1963}98 period, new lists tend to be small, pro"table "rms with abundant investments. After 1977, new lists continue to be small and to grow rapidly. But their pro"tability deteriorates, and new lists that pay dividends become increasingly rare. The new breed of new lists feeds a swelling group of small "rms with low earnings and strong growth opportunities } the timeworn characteristics of "rms that have never paid dividends. Table 5 summarizes annual logit regressions that document more formally the marginal e!ects of size, pro"tability, and investment opportunities on the likelihood that a "rm pays dividends. The size of an NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ "rm for a given year is its NYSE percentile, NYP R , that is, the percent of NYSE "rms that have the same or smaller market capitalization. This size measure is meant to neutralize any e!ects of the growth in typical "rm size through time. Pro"tability is measured as the ratio of a "rm's earnings before interest to its total assets, E R /A R . The proxies for investment opportunities are a "rm's rate of growth of assets, dA R /A R , and its market-to-book ratio, < R /A R . Rather than one overall regression, we estimate the logit regressions year-byyear. In the spirit of Fama and MacBeth (1973) , we use the time-series standard deviations of the annual coe$cients, which allow for correlation of the regression residuals across "rms, to make inferences about average coe$cients. Table 5 Logit regressions to explain which "rms pay dividends
Conxrmation from logit regressions
We estimate logit regressions for each year t of the 1963}98 period. The dependent variable is 1.0 in year t The table shows means (across years) of the regression intercepts (Int) and slopes, and t-statistics for the means, de"ned as the mean divided by its standard error (the times-series standard deviation of the regression coe$cient divided by the square root of the number of years in the period).
Average coe$cient The full-period (1963}98) average slopes from the regressions con"rm our inferences about the roles of size, pro"tability, and investment opportunities in the decision to pay dividends. Larger "rms are more likely to pay dividends; the average slope on NYP R is 37.84 standard errors from zero. More pro"table "rms are more likely to pay dividends; the average slope on E R /A R is 12.20 standard errors from zero. And "rms with more investments are less likely to pay dividends; the average slopes on < R /A R and dA R /A R are !16.93 and !6.50 standard errors from zero. Strong negative average slopes for < R /A R (more than eight standard errors from zero) and strong positive slopes for NYP R and E R /A R (more than nine standard errors from zero) are also observed in every "ve-year subperiod. The average slope for dA R /A R is negative in every subperiod, but the small "ve-year sample size makes the weaker negative marginal e!ect of investment outlays less consistently reliable in the subperiods.
Our results on the characteristics of dividend payers and non-payers complement the evidence in Fama and French (1999) that among dividend payers, larger and more pro"table "rms have higher payout ratios, and "rms with more investments have lower payouts. And all these results are consistent with a pecking-order model in which "rms are reluctant to issue risky securities because of asymmetric information problems (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Myers, 1984) or simply because of high transactions costs. Bigger asymmetric information problems and higher costs when issuing securities can also explain why smaller "rms are less likely to pay dividends. That more pro"table "rms pay more dividends while "rms with more investments pay less is also consistent with the propositions of Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986) about the role of dividends in controlling the agency costs of free cash #ow.
The propensity to pay dividends: qualitative evidence
The surge in new listings in the 1980s and 1990s, and the changing nature of new lists, cause the population of publicly traded "rms to tilt increasingly toward the characteristics } small size, low pro"tability, and strong growth opportunities } of "rms that have never paid dividends. But this is not the whole story for the decline in the percent of dividend payers. Our more interesting result is that, given their characteristics, "rms have become less likely to pay dividends. This section presents some preliminary qualitative evidence. Section 5 then quanti"es how the changing characteristics of "rms combine with lower propensity to pay to explain the decline in the incidence of dividend payers.
If the decline in the percent of dividend payers is due entirely to the changing characteristics of "rms, "rms with particular characteristics should be as likely to pay dividends now as in the past. Fig. 6 suggests that this is not the case. The "gure shows time series plots of the percent of dividend payers among (i) "rms with positive common stock earnings, > R '0, (ii) "rms with negative > R , (iii) Fig. 6 . Percent of payers among "rms with (i) positive and negative earnings on common stock, > R '0 and > R (0; and (ii) earnings before interest but after taxes greater than and less than investment, E R 'dA R and E R (dA R . The sample of Compustat "rms for calendar year t, 1963}98, includes non-"nancial non-utility "rms with "scal year-ends in t that satisfy the data requirements described in the appendix. > R , earnings on common stock, is earnings after interest, taxes, and preferred dividends in year t; E R is earnings before interest but after taxes in year t; and dA R , investment, is the change in the book value of assets from t!1 to t.
"rms with earnings before interest that exceed investment outlays, E R 'dA R , and (iv) "rms with E R (dA R . In all four groups, "rms become less likely to pay dividends later in the sample period.
In 1978, 72.4% of "rms with positive common stock earnings pay dividends. In 1998, 30.0% of pro"table "rms pay dividends, less than half the fraction for 1978. The proportion of payers among "rms with E R 'dA R falls from 68.4% in 1978 to 32.4% in 1998. These results suggest that dividends become less likely among "rms with the characteristics (positive earnings and earnings in excess of investment) of dividend payers. But unpro"table "rms and "rms with investment outlays that exceed earnings also become less likely to pay. For "rms with E R (dA R , the proportion paying dividends falls from 68.6% in 1978 to 15.6% in 1998. Dividends are never common among unpro"table "rms. But these "rms also become less likely to pay dividends in the 1980s and 1990s. Before 1983, about 20% of "rms with negative common stock earnings pay dividends. In 1998, only 7.2% of unpro"table "rms pay dividends. In short, the evidence suggests that "rms become less likely to pay dividends, whatever their characteristics.
It is worth dwelling a bit on these results. The surge in unpro"table nonpaying new lists causes the aggregate pro"tability of "rms that do not pay dividends to fall in the 1980s and 1990s (Table 3) . But Fig. 6 says that this decline in aggregate pro"tability hides the fact that an increasing fraction of "rms with positive earnings } "rms that in the past would typically pay dividends } now choose not to pay. Similarly, for non-payers the spread of aggregate investment over aggregate earnings widens later in the sample period, again largely as a result of new lists. But Fig. 6 says that an increasing fraction of "rms with earnings that exceed investment } "rms that in the past would typically pay dividends } are now non-payers. In short, the surge in unpro"table new lists with investment outlays far in excess of earnings causes the aggregate characteristics of non-payers, documented in Table 3 , to mask widespread evidence of a lower propensity to pay dividends.
Changing characteristics and propensity to pay: quantitative e4ects
This section quanti"es the e!ects of changing characteristics and propensity to pay on the percent of dividend payers. The approach is simple. We "rst estimate the probabilities that "rms with given characteristics (size, pro"tability, and investment opportunities) pay dividends during 1963}77, the 15-year period of Compustat coverage preceding the 1978 peak in the percent of dividend payers. We then apply the probabilities from the 1963}77 base period to the samples of "rm characteristics observed in subsequent years to estimate the expected percent of dividend payers for each year after 1977. Since the probabilities associated with characteristics are "xed at their base period values, variation in the expected percent of payers after 1977 is due to the changing characteristics of sample "rms. We then use the di!erence between the expected percent of payers for a year (calculated using the base period probabilities) and the actual percent to measure the change in the propensity to pay dividends. A decline in the propensity to pay implies a positive di!erence between expected and actual percents of payers.
We use two approaches to estimate the probability function for the base period, logit regressions and relative frequencies of dividend payers in portfolios formed on pro"tability, investment opportunities, and size. We show results that use 1963}77 as the base period, but using 1973}77 (the "rst "ve-year period of NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ coverage) as the base period produces similar results. Table 6 shows the expected percents of dividend payers obtained by applying the average coe$cients from year-by-year logit regressions for 1963}77 to the samples of "rm characteristics of subsequent years. Two sets of results are shown. In one, the regressions use size (NYSE percentile, NYP R ), pro"tability (E R /A R ), and two measures of investment opportunities (< R /A R and dA R /A R ) to explain the probability that a "rm pays dividends. In the other, < R /A R is dropped, leaving dA R /A R as the sole measure of investment opportunities. (The base period regressions are summarized in Table 5 .)
Regression estimates
Why two sets of results? Our approach to measuring the e!ects of changing characteristics on the incidence of dividend payers presumes that the proxies for pro"tability, investment opportunities, and size have constant meaning through time. This presumption is especially suspect for < R /A R . < R /A R drifts up in the 1980s and 1990s (Table 3) . With rational pricing, the drift in < R /A R is due to some mix of (i) increasing pro"tability of assets in place, (ii) more pro"table or more abundant expected investments, or (iii) lower discount rates for expected cash #ows. Pro"tability (E R /A R ) and investment outlays (dA R /A R ) show no clear tendency to increase during the 1980s and 1990s (Table 3) . It is reasonable to conclude that declining discount rates have a role in the drift in < R /A R . For our purposes, upward drift in < R /A R that is not due to improved investment opportunities causes us to overestimate the decline in the percent of payers due to changing characteristics and to understate the decline due to propensity to pay.
Consider "rst the regressions that use NYP R , E R /A R , and both < R /A R , and dA R /A R to explain the probability that a "rm pays dividends. Since we use the same 1963}77 average regression function to estimate the expected percent of payers in each of the following years, changes in the expected percent after 1977 are due to the changing characteristics of sample "rms. When the average regression function for 1963}77 is applied to the sample of "rm characteristics for 1978, the expected proportion of payers is 70.0%. The proportion of dividend payers for 1963}77 is 68.5%. Thus, roughly speaking, the characteristics of "rms in 1978 are similar to those of the base period. The expected proportion of payers falls after 1978, reaching 44.6% in 1998. The 25.4 percentage point decline in the expected proportion of payers, from 70.0% in 1978 to 44.6% in 1998, is an estimate of the e!ect of changing characteristics on the percent of "rms paying dividends.
The actual percent of dividend payers for a given year of the 1978}98 period is also the expected percent that would be produced by a logit regression estimated on that year's sample of "rms. Thus, by comparing the actual percent of payers for a year and the expected percent produced with the regression function for the 1963}77 base period, we can infer the e!ect of changes in the regression function, or equivalently, changes in the propensity to pay dividends. In 1978, the actual percent of payers is only 1.5 percentage points below the expected. The spread between the expected and actual percent widens thereafter. By 1998, when the regression function for 1963}77 predicts that 44.6% of "rms pay dividends, only 21.3% actually pay. The di!erence, 23.3 percentage points, between the expected and actual percents for 1998 estimates the end-of-sample shortfall in the percent of dividend payers due to reduced propensity to pay. Table 6 Estimates from logit regressions of the e!ect of changing characteristics and declining propensity to pay on the percent of "rms paying dividends
We use all "rms for each year of the 1963}77 base period to estimate logit regressions that explain whether a "rm pays dividends. The explanatory variables are pro"tability (E R /A R ), the growth rate of assets (dA R /A R ), the market-to-book ratio (< R /A R ), and the percent of NYSE "rms with the same or lower market capitalization (NYP R ). Firms is the number of "rms in the sample for a year, or the average for a period. Payers is the number (or average number) of dividend payers. Actual Percent is the percent of payers (the ratio of payers to "rms, times 100). The Expected Percent of payers for a year t is estimated by applying the average logit regression coe$cients for 1963}77 to the values of the explanatory variables for each "rm for year t, summing over "rms, dividing by the number of "rms, and then multiplying by 100. The evolution of Expected Percent measures the e!ects of changing characteristics on the percent of dividend payers. Expected!Actual measures the e!ect of propensity to pay. There are two sets of results. One uses < R /A R and dA R /A R to control for investment opportunities; the second uses only dA R /A R . As predicted, when we drop < R /A R from the 1963}77 base period regressions, changing characteristics make a smaller contribution to the decline in the percent of dividend payers. The expected proportion of payers now declines from 66.9% in 1978 to 52.1% in 1998. This 14.8 percentage point decline (due to changing NYP R , E R /A R , and dA R /A R characteristics) compares to the estimated 25.4 percentage point decline obtained when < R /A R is used along with dA R /A R to measure investment opportunities. Conversely, when we drop < R /A R from the base period regressions, lower propensity to pay gets more weight in explaining the declining percent of dividend payers. In 1978 and 1979, the actual percent of payers is slightly higher than the expected percent. Thereafter, the expected percent exceeds the actual, and by increasing amounts. The "nal (1998) shortfall in the proportion of dividend payers due to lower propensity to pay, 30.8%, is 7.5 percentage points higher than the 23.3% estimate obtained when < R /A R is also included in the base period regressions.
One can quarrel about whether excluding < R /A R as a control variable provides cleaner estimates of the decline in the percent of dividend payers due to changing characteristics. But there is no need. The important point is that, with or without < R /A R , the regression approach uncovers the tracks of a potentially elusive phenomenon } the lower propensity of "rms to pay dividends, given their characteristics.
Regressions for diwerent dividend groups
There is a missing variable in the regressions underlying Table 6 } lagged dividend status. Table 7 summarizes annual logit regressions estimated separately for "rms classi"ed as payers, former payers, and "rms that have never paid as of the previous year. The full-period (1963}98) average coe$cients show that the decision to pay dividends in year t depends on dividend status in t!1. Dividend payers produce a large positive average intercept (1.26, t"8.94), but the intercepts for former payers and "rms that have never paid are strongly negative (!3.38, t"!21.84; and !2.16, t"!8.37 ). The regression slopes con"rm that that there is inertia in dividend decisions. Skipping the details, for given positive values of the explanatory variables [size (NYP R ), pro"tability (E R /A R ), and investment opportunities (< R /A R and dA R /A R )], the probability that a dividend payer continues to pay is higher than the probability that a nonpayer with the same characteristics starts paying.
The regressions for the three dividend groups allow us to examine how the e!ects of changing characteristics and propensity to pay di!er across the groups. Table 8 uses the average 1963}77 logit coe$cients for each dividend group to estimate expected percents of payers for each group in subsequent years. The proportion of year t!1 dividend payers expected to continue paying in year t only falls from 97.9% in 1978 to 97.0% in 1998. Thus, roughly speaking, the characteristics of dividend payers do not change much through time. In all but one year of the 1978}98 period, the actual percent of continuing payers falls short of the expected. But the annual di!erences (the e!ect of lower propensity to pay) average only 1.2% for 1978}98. This small decline in the propensity to pay nevertheless has a nontrivial cumulative e!ect on the payer population. The Table 7 Logit regressions to explain which "rms pay dividends
The logit regressions are estimated separately for each year t of the 1963}98 period for (i) "rms that paid dividends in year t!1 (Dividend Payers), (ii) "rms that have Never Paid as of year t!1, and (iii) "rms that did not pay in t!1 but did pay in an earlier year (Former Payers). The dependent variable is 1.0 in year t if a "rm pays dividends, 0.0 otherwise. The explanatory variables are NYSE percentile (NYP R ), the market-to-book ratio (< R /A R ), the rate of growth of assets (dA R /A R ), and pro"tability (E R /A R ). The table shows means (across years) of the regression intercepts (Int) and slopes, and t-statistics for the means, de"ned as the mean divided by its standard error (the times-series standard deviation of the regression coe$cient divided by the square root of the number of years in the period). annual spreads between expected and actual percents of payers for 1978}98 cumulate to about 320 payers lost due to lower propensity to pay. Changing characteristics and lower propensity to pay have bigger e!ects on the dividend decisions of former payers. When the average coe$cients of the 1963}77 regressions for former payers are applied to the former payer samples of later years, the expected proportion of those resuming dividends falls (due to changes in characteristics) from 17.4% in 1978 to 9.9% in 1998. Given their characteristics, the propensity of former payers to resume dividends is also lower after 1978; the di!erence between expected and actual percents resuming is positive after 1979, and the average di!erence for 1978}98 is 3.1 percentage points. In 1998, 9.9% of former payers are expected to resume, but only 4.0% (less than half the expected number) actually do.
Average coe$cient t-statistic
Changing characteristics and lower propensity to pay also have strong separate e!ects on the dividend decisions of "rms that have never paid. Changes in characteristics cause the expected proportion of initiators among "rms that have never paid to fall from 11.3% in 1978 to 5.2% in 1998, a decline of more than half. The consistently positive di!erences between the expected and actual percents of initiators after 1978 then say that controlling for characteristics, "rms that have never paid dividends become less likely to start. For 1978}98, the di!erence averages 3.8 percentage points (6.8% expected versus 3.0% actual). In 1998, 5.2% of the never paid are expected to start paying dividends, but only 0.8% (less than one-sixth the expected number) actually do } rather strong evidence of a declining propensity to initiate dividends.
The regressions estimated separately for payers, former payers, and "rms that have never paid are useful for documenting that, to di!erent degrees, changing characteristics and lower propensity to pay a!ect the dividend decisions of all three groups. But the regressions are inappropriate for estimating how the decline in the overall percent of dividend payers splits between characteristics and propensity to pay. Suppose we estimate the overall expected percent of payers for a year as the sum of the expected number of payers in each dividend group divided by the total number of "rms (Table 8) . With separate regressions, the probability that a payer continues to pay is higher than the probability that an otherwise similar non-payer initiates dividends. The expected number of payers for a year thus depends on the distribution of "rms across dividend groups in the preceding year. Toward the end of the sample period, many "rms are non-payers because of the lower propensity to pay. As a result, the decline from 1978 to 1998 in the overall expected percent of payers combines the e!ects of changing characteristics and lower propensity to pay, and the 1998 di!erence between the overall actual and expected percents of payers understates the cumulative e!ect of propensity to pay.
We are interested in long-term dividend patterns. Under reasonable assumptions, the regression approach that ignores lagged dividend status (Table 6 ) does a better job capturing the long-term e!ects of changing characteristics and Table 8 Estimates from logit regressions of the e!ect of changing characteristics and propensity to pay on the percent of "rms paying dividends
The logit regressions are estimated separately for each year t of the 1963}77 period for (i) "rms that paid dividends in year t!1 propensity to pay. If propensity to pay, given a "rm's characteristics, is constant prior to 1978, the average allocations of "rms across dividend groups during the 1963}77 base period should largely be driven by characteristics rather than by lagged dividend status. In this situation, the base period average regression function that ignores lagged dividend status captures the pre-1978 long-term propensity to pay, given characteristics. And applying the base period regression function to the samples of "rm characteristics of subsequent years produces estimates of the long-term e!ects of changing characteristics and propensity to pay.
Estimates of base period probabilities from portfolios
The logit regressions use a functional form for the base period relation between characteristics and the likelihood that a "rm pays dividends that may be misspeci"ed. Our second approach addresses this problem by allowing the base period probabilities to vary with characteristics in an unrestricted way.
Each year from 1963 to 1977, we form 27 portfolios as the intersections of independent sorts of "rms on pro"tability (
, and size. We sort "rms into three equal groups on E R /A R , < R /A R , and dA R /A R , but we do not form equal groups on size. Instead, we use the 20th and 50th percentiles of market capitalization for NYSE "rms to allocate NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ "rms to portfolios. We use NYSE percentiles to prevent the growing population of small NASDAQ "rms from changing the meaning of small, medium, and large over the sample period. The 20th and 50th NYSE percentiles lead to similar average numbers of "rms in the medium and large groups (and many more in the small group). To have a manageable number of portfolios, each with many "rms, we use < R /A R or dA R /A R (but not both) to control for investment opportunities. We estimate the base period probabilities that "rms in each of the 27 portfolios pay dividends as the sum of the number of payers in a portfolio during the 15 years of 1963}77 divided by the sum of the number of "rms in the portfolio. These base period probabilities are free of assumptions about the form of the relation between characteristics and the probability that a "rm pays dividends (except, of course, that all "rms in a portfolio are assigned the same probability). The number of observations in the base period probability estimates is always at least 45, and it is 165 or greater for all but one portfolio.
The base period probabilities vary across portfolios in a familiar way (Table 9) . Larger "rms are more likely to pay dividends; controlling for pro"tability (E R /A R ) and investment opportunities (< R /A R or dA R /A R ), the 1963}77 probability that a "rm pays dividends increases across size portfolios. More pro"table "rms are more likely to pay dividends; controlling for size and < R /A R or dA R /A R , high E R /A R portfolios have higher percents of payers in 1963}77 than low E R /A R portfolios. Finally, "rms with more investments are less likely to pay dividends; the high < R /A R (or dA R /A R ) portfolio in a size-E R /A R group typically has a lower base period percent of dividend payers than the low < R /A R (or dA R /A R ) portfolio. We form portfolios each year after 1977 using breakpoints designed to have the same economic meaning as those of the 1963}77 base period. For pro"tability and investment opportunities, we assume that values of E R /A R , < R /A R , and dA R /A R have constant meaning. (Again, this assumption is shaky for < R /A R .) Thus, in forming portfolios after 1977, the E R /A R , < R /A R , and dA R /A R breakpoints are averages (across years) of the breakpoints for 1963}77. Holding breakpoints constant means that outside the base period, the split of "rms across E R /A R , < R /A R , and dA R /A R groups varies with changes in the distribution of these characteristics across "rms. Finally, we assume that the 20th and 50th percentile breakpoints for NYSE market capitalization, allowed to vary through time, are measures of size with relatively constant economic meaning. The proportions of "rms in the three size groups vary through time with the size and number of AMEX and NASDAQ "rms relative to NYSE "rms.
The expected percent of dividend payers for a given year t after 1977 is
where n GR is the number of "rms in portfolio i in year t, N R is the total number of "rms, and p G is the expected proportion of dividend payers in portfolio i, estimated as the actual proportion for 1963}77. Since the expected proportion of payers in a portfolio is "xed at the 1963}77 base value, the aggregate expected percent of payers varies through time because changes in the characteristics of "rms alter the allocation of "rms across the 27 portfolios. The evolution of the expected percent of payers after 1977 can thus be attributed to changing characteristics. The di!erence between the expected percent of payers for a year and the actual percent then measures the e!ect of changes in the propensity to pay dividends.
When < R /A R is used to measure investment opportunities, the expected proportion of payers for 1978 produced by the portfolio approach is 70.0% (Table 10 ). The expected proportion falls over the next 20 years, to 53.3% in 1998. Thus, when < R /A R measures investment opportunities, the portfolio approach says that changes in the characteristics of "rms cause the proportion of payers to drop by 16.7 percentage points from 1978 to 1998. The actual proportion of "rms paying dividends in 1978, 68.5%, is close to the expected 70.0%. Thereafter, the spread between expected and actual widens. In the "nal year, 1998, 53.3% of "rms are expected to pay dividends but only 21.3% actually Table 9 Percents of dividend payers in 27 portfolios formed on size, pro"tability, and either market-to-book ratio or investment outlays Each year we form two sets of 27 portfolios of NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ "rms, using sorts on pro"tability (E Table 10 E!ects of changing characteristics and propensity to pay on the percent of "rms paying dividends, estimated from 27 portfolios formed on size, pro"tability (E R /A R ), and either market-to-book ratio
Investment variable is
Firms is the number of "rms in the sample for a year, or the average for a period. Actual Percent is the percent of payers (the ratio of payers to "rms, times 100). The Expected Percent of payers for a year is the number of "rms in each of the 27 size-
for the year times the proportion of dividend payers in the portfolio during the 1963}77 base period, summed over the 27 portfolios, divided by the total of "rms in the 27 portfolios for the year, and then multiplied by 100. The expected percents change through time due to changes in the characteristics (size, E R /A R , and < R /A R or dA R /A R ) of sample "rms. Expected!Actual, the di!erence between the expected and actual percents of payers, measures the e!ect of changing propensity to pay. pay. The di!erence, 32.0 percentage points, is the end-of-sample estimate of the decline in the percent of payers due to reduced propensity to pay dividends. Using dA R /A R rather than < R /A R to measure investment opportunities lowers our estimate of the e!ect of changing characteristics on the decline in the percent of dividend payers. The expected proportion of payers now falls by only 6.8 percentage points, from 65.1% in 1978 to 58.3% in 1998. Conversely, using dA R /A R rather than < R /A R to form portfolios increases the share of the decline in the percent of payers attributed to lower propensity to pay. In 1978, the actual proportion of payers is 3.5 percentage points above the expected. After 1979, however, the expected percent exceeds the actual, and by increasing amounts. In 1998, 58.3% of "rms are expected to pay dividends, but only 21.3% in fact pay. Thus, the end-of-sample shortfall in the proportion of dividend payers due to lower propensity to pay is 37.0 percentage points.
In short, like the logit tests, the portfolio approach says that changing characteristics and lower propensity to pay both have roles in the decline in the percent of "rms paying dividends. And lower propensity to pay is at least as important as changing characteristics.
Propensity to pay: entrails from the portfolio approach
What kinds of "rms do not pay dividends in 1998 that would have paid in earlier years? The answer from Table 9 is } all kinds. Lower propensity to pay cuts across all size, pro"tability, and investment groups. Table 9 shows percents of dividend payers in the portfolios formed on size, E R /A R , and < R /A R or dA R /A R . A portfolio's expected percent of payers after 1977 is the actual percent for the 1963}77 base period. Thus, the time path of the percent of payers for a portfolio traces the e!ects of propensity to pay dividends for "rms with given size, E R /A R , and < R /A R or dA R /A R characteristics. The results for the 27 portfolios formed on size, E R /A R , and dA R /A R are easiest to judge since each of these portfolios has at least 47 "rms in 1998. The percents of dividend payers in the 27 portfolios are often higher in 1978 than in 1963}77. After 1978, the propensity to pay declines. For every portfolio, the percent of payers is lower in 1998 than in 1978. The results for the 27 portfolios formed on size, E R /A R , and < R /A R are similar; the percent of dividend payers declines (due to lower propensity to pay) in all but one portfolio. The only exception, small "rms with medium E R /A R and high < R /A R , occurs because the percent of payers in 1978 is abnormally low. The 1998 proportion, 11.5%, is well below the average for 1963}77, 32.5%.
At the 1978 peak, most big stocks pay dividends whatever their characteristics. When dA R /A R is used to control for growth opportunities, the 1978 proportion of payers exceeds 85.0% in all nine big-stock portfolios, and it is above 92.0% in seven of the nine (Table 9 ). But even among big stocks, the propensity to pay declines sharply after 1978. When dA R /A R is used to measure growth opportunities, the 1998 proportion of payers never reaches 80.0% in any big-stock portfolio, it is below 65.0% for "ve of the nine, and the 1998 proportion of payers is 40.6% or less in three big-stock portfolios.
The decline in the propensity to pay dividends is even larger among small stocks. When dA R /A R is used to measure growth opportunities, the 1978 proportion of payers is less than 40.0% in only one of nine small-stock portfolios and it is 52.0% or higher in seven (Table 9 ). In contrast, the 1998 proportion of dividend payers exceeds 20.0% only in the four small-stock portfolios with medium or high pro"tability and low or medium investment outlays. In the "ve small-stock portfolios with low pro"tability or high investment outlays, dividend payers are an endangered species; the 1998 proportion of payers is 13.1% or less.
Finally, controlling for size and investment opportunities, the percent of dividend payers declines after 1978 in each of the three pro"tability groups, but there is no particular pattern across E R /A R groups. In contrast, controlling for size and pro"tability, the propensity to pay declines more from 1978 to 1998 for "rms with high investment outlays. In other words, investment outlays become more of a deterrent to dividends (a result that seems in line with the logit regressions in Table 5 ). The big-stock portfolios provide striking examples. In 1978, 85.7%, 97.8%, and 92.4% of the "rms in the three big-stock portfolios with high dA R /A R pay dividends. In 1998, only 28.4%, 40.6%, and 33.6% pay. Clearly, rapidly growing large "rms no longer feel compelled to pay dividends.
Share repurchases
Declining propensity to pay suggests that "rms have become aware of the tax disadvantage of dividends. Consistent with this view, Table 11 con"rms earlier evidence (Bagwell and Shoven, 1989; Dunsby, 1995) that share repurchases surge in the mid-1980s. For 1973}77 and 1978}82 , aggregate share repurchases average 3.37% and 5.12% of aggregate earnings. For 1983}98, repurchases are 31.42% of earnings. Bagwell and Shoven (1989) argue that the increase in repurchases indicates that "rms have learned to substitute repurchases for dividends in order to generate lower-taxed capital gains for stockholders. But subsequent tests of this hypothesis produce mixed results (DeAngelo et al., 2000; Jagannathan et al., 2000; Grullon and Michaely, 2000) .
For our purposes, repurchases turn out to be rather unimportant. In particular, we show that because repurchases are primarily the province of dividend payers, they leave most of the decline in the percent of payers unexplained. Instead, the primary e!ect of repurchases is to increase the already high cash payouts of dividend payers.
We "rst address a problem. Previous papers treat all share repurchases as non-cash dividends, that is, a repackaging of shareholder wealth that substitutes capital value for cash dividends. There are two cases where repurchases do not have this e!ect: (i) repurchased stock is often reissued to employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) and as executive stock options, and (ii) repurchased stock is often reissued to the acquired "rm in a merger. [Allen and Michaely (1995) show that the surge in repurchases after 1983 lines up with a surge in Table 11 Aggregate dividends, share repurchases, share issues, and changes in treasury stock as percents of aggregate earnings and market equity
We calculate annual ratios as the aggregate value of the numerator divided by the aggregate value of the denominator, and then average the ratios over the years in a period. D R and > R are dividends and after-tax earnings to common stock for "scal years that end in calendar year t. ME R is the market value of common equity at the end of "scal year t. 1963}98 1983}98 1963}67 1968}72 1973}77 1978}82 1983}87 1988}92 1993}98 All "rms mergers.] An acquiring "rm repurchases stock when it wishes to "nance a merger with retained earnings or debt but the acquired "rm (for tax reasons) prefers stock. Repurchases to complete mergers simply help "nance this form of investment. Like other investments, mergers allow "rms to transform earnings into capital value rather than dividends. But repurchases of stock to "nance a merger are not a source of additional capital value, beyond what is produced by the merger. A better measure of repurchases that qualify as non-cash dividends is the annual change in treasury stock. Treasury stock captures the cumulative e!ects of stock repurchases and reissues, and it is not a!ected by new issues of stock (seasoned equity o!erings). Treasury stock data are not available on Compustat before 1982, so the "rst change is for 1983. But the treasury stock data do cover the period of strong repurchase activity. Some "rms use the retirement method, rather than treasury stock, to account for repurchases. Our aggregate changes in treasury stock include the net repurchases of these "rms, measured (for each "rm) as the di!erence between purchases and sales of stock, when the di!erence is positive, and zero otherwise. (See the appendix for details.) During 1983}98, the annual change in treasury stock, d¹ R , is less than half of gross share repurchases, SP R ; speci"cally, d¹ R and SP R average 14.95% and 31.42% of earnings (Table 11 ). Cash dividends are 45.24% of earnings, so if gross repurchases are treated as an additional payout of earnings, the total payout for 1983}98 averages 76.66% of earnings. Substituting the more appropriate annual change in treasury stock drops the payout to (a still high) 60.19% of earnings.
Aggregate changes in treasury stock are substantial relative to aggregate earnings, but they fall far short of explaining the decline in the percent of dividend payers due to lower propensity to pay. The problem is that the fraction of non-payers with positive d¹ R is low. During 1983}98, on average only 14.5% of non-payers have positive d¹ R (Table 12 ). And the percent of "rms with positive d¹ R overstates the extent to which "rms substitute repurchases for dividends. Consider a "rm that repurchases shares in one "scal year and reissues them as part of an ESOP, executive compensation plan, or merger in the next. Because the repurchase and reissue are spread across two "scal years, they cause a positive change in d¹ R in the "rst year and a negative change in the second. Although the repurchase just accommodates a reissue, a simple count of "rms with positive d¹ R misclassi"es the repurchase as a substitute for a cash dividend. On average, 6.9% of non-payers have negative d¹ R during 1983}98. The results for 1993}98 are similar; 14.5% of non-payers have positive d¹ R and 6.6% have negative d¹ R . On average, 76.4% of Compustat "rms do not pay dividends during 1993}98. Thus, even if we use our upper bound of 14.5% to estimate the fraction of non-payers that use share repurchases as a substitute for dividends, this group is only 11.1% (0.764 * 0.145) of all "rms. This is about one-third of the smaller Table 12 Percent of "rms with positive and negative changes in treasury stock
The change in treasury stock, d¹ R , is measured from the end of "scal year t!1 to the end of "scal year t. The reported percent of "rms with a positive change in treasury stock, d¹ R '0, or a negative change in treasury stock, d¹ R (0, is the average of the annual percents. Positive changes in treasury stock include "rms that use the retirement method to account for repurchases if their repurchases for "scal year t exceed their stock issues. Negative changes in treasury stock do not include "rms that use the retirement method and have negative net repurchases. The results are shown for all "rms and for "rms grouped according to dividend status. estimate (32.0) of the shortfall in the percent of payers that the portfolio approach of the preceding section attributes to lower propensity to pay dividends. Thus, lower propensity to pay must be related to other aspects of the investment and "nancing decisions of non-payers. Net repurchases are larger and more prevalent among dividend payers. On average, 33.4% of dividend payers have positive d¹ R during 1983}98, versus 14.5% for non-payers (Table 12 ). The aggregate d¹ R of dividend payers averages 0.89% of their aggregate market equity, versus 0.28% for non-payers (Table 11 ). Aggregate cash dividends average 2.78% of the aggregate market equity of dividend payers during 1983}98. Thus, dividend payers use share repurchases rather than dividends for about 25% of their cash payments to shareholders.
The cash dividend payout ratio of dividend payers shows no tendency to decline. The aggregate dividends of payers are 47.22% of their aggregate earnings in 1983}98, versus 44.78% for 1963}98. And on average, 92.2% of the annual aggregate change in treasury stock during 1983}98 is by "rms that also pay dividends (Table 4) . We infer that the large share repurchases of 1983}98 are mostly due to an increase in the desired payout ratios of dividend payers, which they are reluctant to satisfy with cash dividends. Table 3 then shows that the higher payout ratios of dividend payers during 1983}98 are associated with lower rates of investment (dA R /A R ) and higher book leverage (¸R/A R ). Finally, even during the 1993}98 period, when dividend payers are only 23.6% of Compustat "rms (Table 1) , they nevertheless account for 91.7% of common stock earnings (Table 4) . It is thus not surprising that the aggregate payout ratio D R /> R (the ratio of aggregate dividends to aggregate common stock earnings) for all "rms is basically the same as the ratio for dividend payers } and likewise shows no tendency to decline through time. Con"rming Dunsby (1995) , Table 11 shows that the aggregate payout ratio for all "rms actually increases from 33.95% in 1973}77, when 64.3% of "rms pay dividends, to 39.31% in 1993}98, when only 23.6% of "rms pay dividends.
We emphasize, however, that the aggregate payout ratio says nothing about the propensity of "rms to pay dividends. As noted earlier, the surge in unpro"table non-paying new lists in the 1980s and 1990s keeps the aggregate pro"ts of non-payers low even though the non-payer group includes an increasing fraction of "rms with positive earnings } "rms that in the past would have paid dividends. As a result, the aggregate payout ratio for all "rms masks the kind of widespread evidence of lower propensity to pay dividends, among individual "rms of all types, that is obvious in Tables 6, 8 , and (especially) 9.
Conclusions
From a post-1972 peak of 66.5% in 1978, the proportion of dividend payers among NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ non-"nancial non-utility "rms falls to 20.8% in 1999. The decline in the incidence of dividend payers is in part due to an increasing tilt of publicly traded "rms toward the characteristics of "rms that have never paid dividends } small size, low earnings, and large investments relative to earnings. This change in the nature of publicly traded "rms is driven by a surge in new listings after 1978 and by the changing nature of new lists. Before 1978, newly listed "rms have strong investment opportunities (high asset growth rates and high market value of assets relative to book value) and they are more pro"table than seasoned "rms. After 1978, new lists continue to have high < R /A R and high asset growth rates, but their pro"tability falls. The surge in new lists and their changing characteristics produce a swelling group of small "rms with low pro"tability but strong investment opportunities that never pay dividends.
The change in the characteristics of "rms is important in the declining incidence of dividend payers. But it is only half the story. Our more interesting result is that given their characteristics, "rms have become less likely to pay dividends. We use logit regressions and a portfolio approach to document that characteristics and propensity to pay make large separate contributions to the decline in the percent of payers. When < R /A R is used to measure investment opportunities, characteristics and propensity to pay are roughly equal partners in the decline in the percent of dividend payers. When only actual investment outlays, dA R /A R , are used to measure investment opportunities, propensity to pay has the larger role.
Lower propensity to pay is quite general. The percent of dividend payers among "rms with positive earnings declines after 1978. But the percent of payers among "rms with negative earnings also declines. Small "rms become much less likely to pay dividends after 1978, but there is also a lower incidence of dividend payers among large "rms. Firms with many investments become much less likely to pay dividends after 1978, but dividends also become less likely among "rms with fewer investments.
The e!ects of changing characteristics and propensity to pay vary across dividend groups. The characteristics of dividend payers (large, pro"table "rms) do not change much after 1978, and controlling for characteristics, payers become only slightly more likely to stop paying. Changing characteristics and lower propensity to pay show up more clearly in the dividend decisions of former payers and "rms that have never paid. Lower pro"tability and strong growth opportunities produce much lower expected rates of dividend initiation by "rms that have never paid. But controlling for characteristics, "rms that have never paid also initiate dividends at much lower rates after 1978, and former payers become much less likely to resume dividends.
The evidence that, controlling for characteristics, "rms become less likely to pay dividends says that the perceived bene"ts of dividends have declined through time. Some (but surely not all) of the possibilities are: (i) lower transactions costs for selling stocks for consumption purposes, in part due to an increased tendency to hold stocks via open end mutual funds; (ii) larger holdings of stock options by managers who prefer capital gains to dividends; and (iii) better corporate governance technologies (e.g., more prevalent use of stock options) that lower the bene"ts of dividends in controlling agency problems between stockholders and managers.
Appendix. Data and variable de5nitions
The Compustat sample for calendar year t, 1963}98, includes those "rms with "scal year-ends in t that have the following data (Compustat data items in parentheses): total assets (6), stock price (199) and shares outstanding (25) at the end of the "scal year, income before extraordinary items (18), interest expense (15), dividends per share by ex date (26), preferred dividends (19), and (a) preferred stock liquidating value (10), (b) preferred stock redemption value (56), or (c) preferred stock carrying value (130). Firms must also have (a) stockholder's equity (216), (b) liabilities (181), or (c) common equity (60) and preferred stock par value (130). Total assets must be available in years t and t!1. The other items must be available in t. We also use, but do not require, balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit (35), income statement deferred taxes (50), purchases of common and preferred stock (115), sales of common and preferred stock (108), and common treasury stock (226). We exclude "rms with book equity (BE R ) below $250,000 or assets (A R ) below $500,000. To ensure that "rms are publicly traded, the Compustat sample includes only "rms with CRSP share codes of 10 or 11, and we use only the "scal years a "rm is in the CRSP database at its "scal year-end. The CRSP sample, used in Tables 1 and 2 and Figs. 1, 2, and 5, includes NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ securities with CRSP share codes of 10 or 11. A "rm must have market equity data (price and shares outstanding) for December of year t to be in the CRSP sample for that year. We exclude utilities (SIC codes 4900}4949) and "nancial "rms (SIC codes 6000}6999) from both samples. 
A.1. Derived variables

A.2. Dividend payers and non-payers
A "rm in the Compustat sample is de"ned as a dividend payer in calendar year t if it has positive dividends per share by the ex date (26) in the (last) "scal year that ends in t. A "rm in the CRSP sample is de"ned as a dividend payer in calendar year t if its with-dividend return exceeds its without-dividend return in any month of year t. A CRSP "rm must have at least seven months of good returns in year t to be classi"ed as a non-payer. A "rm is included in only the All Firms category for a year if it has fewer than seven good returns and there is no month when its with-dividend and without-dividend returns di!er.
